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 Abstract: Skepticism about moral responsibility (SMR) is the view that takes seriously the 
possibility that human beings are never morally responsible for their actions. This presentation 
examines the most convincing case for SMR: Galen Strawson’s (1986; 1994; 2011) Basic 
Argument for the impossibility of ultimate moral responsibility- which rejected the traditional 
compatibilist view of free will. Recent notable attempts to refute to Strawson could be classified 
into three categories, including: (1) arguing for the possibility of self-creation: Kane (2000; 
2007) Self-forming Action and Roskies (2012) structure of causation and control. (2) arguing for 
a form of semi-compatibilism: Fischer (2004; 2007) Frankfurt-type case example and (3) attempt 
to revitalize Mele (1995) Modest moral responsibility: McKenna (2016); Coates (2017). 
Nevertheless, this presentation would argue that these contemporary responses have not been 
successful in refuting Strawson’s Basic Argument.  
Christian Worldview Integration: At first glance, SMR may seem to pose certain threats 
against the Christian worldview by denying the possibility of agent-responsible acts, and thus the 
existence of moral absolutes. However, from another perspective, if we agree on the existence of 
moral responsibly, SMR could possibly allow us to form a basis for a version of moral argument 
for God, i.e., the existence of moral responsibility entails the actuality of causally independent 
acts- which can only be explained by the truth of a casually independent being. 
 
 
  
 
